**III STRUCTURES OF ORIENTATION OF THE LIFEWORLD, AND THE BASIC STRUCTURES OF LIFEWORLD SITUATIVITY**

No. 16

Orientation and practice of access.

<An all-embracing system of possible spatial and temporal orientations as presupposition for intersubjective practice, and for an intersubjective surrounding world>[[1]](#footnote-1)

*<Content:> We and our surroundings. Normal idea of a surrounding world for us. Possibility of partial anomaly, and possibility of joint practice. The subjectively oriented world as world of practice, initially of the practice of access, and the practice of handling, that is, the individual – my practice. Everyone has his oriented world, and his practice of handling, but [he] can co-experience the [world] of the other one in an understanding way.*

We have to distinguish the world as the same world of realities within the all-embracing multiplicity of its possible orientations, and the world in its current determined orientation, but with the horizon of possible orientations as my practical possibilities of a practice of access. The world is given as oriented: I have a near-sphere, and a distant sphere, I have my body as zero object of proximity, and again [I have] this [proximity as] being oriented, and being different for the different senses, - which requires special descriptions. That which is distant is accessible: It becomes an approaching within the access, whereby certainly that which has just been near becomes distant. Within the proximity itself differences of better and worse, of the best possible as being thus near that I am immediately at it, [that] I have it in immediate proximity, whereby **[146]** the concrete object though is only given in relativity of its given near and distant determinations, and is in need of an experience process, a practical one, of the synthetic production of the best possible total givenness which realizes its proximity as close proximity. That which is distant changes into something closely given while approaching, and the closely given <becomes> the best given within the all-round bringing close.

In every now, and every concrete present I have this mobile orientation world within a near-and-distant-mode, and at the same time [I have] every single object, wherever I look, within a givenness of orientation belonging to it, fitted into the synthetic unitary whole of the total orientation of the de facto experienced world. Like every single thing within its orientational how, thus the whole has its practical horizon of possible experience within its complete how which the experiencing ego can make clear according to its special possibilities (each of which are possibilities of access for any distant objects), and which it [the experiencing ego] can realize as long as there are no restraints of its I-can.

The practice of orientation takes place somatically within the subjective moving: ability of moving, allowing to move (at least within the primitive *fiat*), and realizing possible moving, possibly within the inhibiting of the *fiat*, and considering, and practically deciding, and then <within> the actualizing immediately or within the after that has been put in advance, etc.

The oriented world, the world within the changing of these orientations, the same real world, with things as moving or resting, as changing or not changing, changing of its own accord, or changing due to the subjects; thereby the connection that each I-move performed in person, that is, each change of orientation, designates an objective, a real move of the body which shows itself in thematic regard towards the body during its subjective moving as its real moving within real experience. The body is a real object, but at the same time [it is] the real thing conditioning the changes of orientation within the rest of the world of realities <by way of its> changes from its ego or within the ego-sphere. The body is the immediate object of all experiencing practice that has an effect by way of acting.

**[147]** How about the synthetic connection of my orientation’s givennesses, of my practical world of orientation, and of the others’ [practical world of orientation]? By putting myself in the other’s place, I understand him in his surroundings as [being in] an oriented world. But I also understand his near things as the same, that are distant things for me, <and> his distant things as the same, that are near things for me, <and> his distant things as the same, that are near things for me, his “right” as my “left”, etc. The change which my subjective moving effects within my world of orientation, does not change anything in his [world of orientation], apart from his finding my body within his world of orientation as presenting itself in such a way that he experiences it as really moving, and likewise deforming [body]. This implies that for everyone, according to the intersubjective (communicative) experience the world experienced by him is experienced and experienceable in a system of possible orientations which is commonly known from its original experience, and [which is] constantly effective as horizon, [and] which is identically the same for everyone else. By my understanding somebody he is not only understood as subject of an oriented world, but of such [a world] which as an oriented [world] has its systematic horizon, - like it is the case with me. And not only this. He is not subject of “some” oriented world, but **of the same world** with the same system of orientation like my own, but in such a way that necessarily his world orientation differs from mine within the same system.

Exactly this implies: We have, initially in every present, **a common practical surrounding world** as made possible, initially in a practical way as common experience world within a common, i.e. in a practical experiencing that is in a certain way exchangeable. But this possibility is not yet completely made clear with what I have said. For example it needed to be explicated more closely: The system of orientation is constantly given to me as undetermined horizon, but within a formal predelineation. Within the access to the distant the orientation’s style does change in the known way, but the thing’s determined givenness of orientation as optimal [givenness of orientation] of the near thing is given to me only within the actual access, and thereby itself, like it is in practical truth. Likewise I understand the approaching of the other one in his experiencing acting (the regarding-more-closely, [the] all-round-inspecting), but the completely determined orientations, which **[148]** the other one experiences, and thereby the real in its selfhood, which the other one has achieved is not given to me, not achieved for my part. Unless I for my part actually approach, and – what is practically possible to some degree – regard the same thing, and put it into our common near sphere.

But I see, that to the description of our common world experience as world of our orientations belongs in the same system of orientation: 1) not only this, that the thing is intersubjectively identifiable within the same system of orientation (the being oriented as such), [and] thus is communicative community; not only is the surrounding world the same as real world, but it is thus only due to the fact that orientations can be the same, though not at the same time; 2) of the whole total system of orientation a certain system of the whole surrounding world is actualized within the how of orientation for everyone, into which every oriented thing is fitted. But my world orientation, and the [world orientation] of everyone else has a common sphere being a relative common near sphere in relation to an open endless distant sphere. It is not easy to describe this.

The temporal orientation as belonging to the intersubjective practically common world is inseparable from the spatial orientation. The real world which I experience has its real space which is omnitemporal, and thus [it has] its real time. This world is subjectively given for me in spatial orientations; the orientations <are given> in subjective temporality, in the temporal modes of orientation of the “being present”, “being past” (the “being future” as form of the anticipated orientation). The spatial itself, the spatial real, presents itself within the subjective temporal givennesses of orientation of the spatial, in its real temporality.

The spatiotemporal orientation then is intersubjectively in unity; but in temporal regard, and in contrast to the spatial [regard] <it is> thus that we all have one and the same present, whereas the real being present has for everyone another spatial orientation. The present thing is a present real thing, and is as that identical to the spatial orientations being distributed on different subjects. For every subject something present is given in only **one** orientation if we understand the present as the momentary now. Accordingly we all have one and the same past. – every plurally grasped past presents itself within **[149]** the manifold spatial orientations, each of which falls to an ego-subject respectively.

We thus have an objective experience world, the world of the practice, which is **objective** in temporal orientation, objective as present, past, and future. In the constant change of this objective time orientation proceeding in unchangeable intersubjective necessity the real time preserves itself identically and as identically experienceable, to which one can always return due to the change of present and pastnesses, or rather [due to the change] of the ever new presents changing into each other, into pastnesses, and of every pastness into past of pastnesses, <which is> inherent form of the τί ἦν εἶναι as of the real, within the temporal kind of access of ever renewed recollection, and <that> can be re-experienced as the same past within the change of the mode of the past: And that which one can regain thus identically, can be regained by anyone who has experienced it as the same objective real-past.

But it has to be considered as well that that which I experience can indeed be experienced by anyone in a certain way within the same how of the orientation, since according to the form everyone has the same spatiotemporal system of orientation at his disposal; but he can experience **the same** within the temporally determined orientation only **in a temporal shift**, and furthermore, he can afterwards experience within another stretch of its real duration that which he has not actually experienced. Again this implies that everyone could have experienced what I experience, and he does not experience, and likewise that all past real could have been experienced by anyone who did not experience it. Presupposition for all that: We experience the same surrounding world and continually the same surrounding world experienceable for us all in the same experiential determinations. Exactly this is the presupposition for normality. And thus is described the **normal idea** “we and our surrounding world”, or the normal idea of a surrounding world for us, for us all, who we are presupposed as being normal.

Now the idea of an **abnormal** experience world, of an all commonly experienced world of realities being experienced as the same, and then necessarily experienced as being oriented, but in such a way that not all determinations experienced by me are experienceable for anyone, and vice and versa. Thus real determinations are experienced by me, and **[150]** then spatiotemporally oriented [determinations] which others possibly do not experience or [do] not [experience] as being identical, but maybe as being similar. The same objective real world has common determinations, and due to the community [it has] at the same time contradictory “secondary” qualities of abnormal subjects. Logically one would say: The real being cannot be afflicted with contradiction.

But although I cannot contradict myself, if all change of predicates becomes reconciled for me in unanimity within the givenness of the same real under the title “change of the real”, does this need to be accepted intersubjectively? Why should it not be possible that a real world is given and continuously experienceable as common to all experiencing subjects, whereas the identification in reality and possibility only concerns one layer of the concretely experienced real for every subject. And is not the abnormality a fact, prior to all theory? Is it not a basic trait of the universal experience world?

Certainly, only as far as community reaches within the constitution of reality determinations, only thus far <does> the possibility of a common **practice**, co-related to these determinations, <reach>. **My** real world is the base of my practice with the determinations constituted for me (originally and secondarily), and this practice exclusively relates to the experienced world as such. It is a problem for me, the single ego, to consider the possibility, in how far a real world can be constituted for me with the experience determinations that are not quite really identifiable, - like if the colors changed without a rule, whereas things were identifiable, which respectively needed to appear colored. But as far as I do have a world, things with determinations, which I am able to get to know by way of an approach, and on which I can then count practically, thus far I do have a possible practice of “reason”. As far as I am able to understand myself with a second one , and with many others therein, who thus experience the same things with the same determinations, thus far I can have a common practical world with them, related to the same determinations. But someone who is colorblind, and someone who sees colors in a regular way cannot have the field of coloredness as something practically common within a pure experience practice (a practice which does not use any tools of a science which for its part presupposes an objectively true world in the sense of natural science); **[151]** unless it turns out in common experience, in which only becomes apparent initially that they indeed both do see, but according to the field consequently see different things, that relations turn out within the statements that make possible an indirect attribution.

Appendix X

The oriented surrounding world.

“Oriented” space, or rather, perceptional surrounding world, world as such[[2]](#footnote-2)

*<Content:> The different relative orientations. – Not only every individual, but every home world, every national and supernatural world has its own orientation. To all modes of egoicalness of lower and higher level, to every mode of the we, and also of the “we and the foreigners around us and external to us” belongs as ego-subjectivity its world as oriented world.*

*World as such constitutes itself as synthesis of oriented worlds of different levels. Accordingly this belongs in a basic essential way to the problem of the correlative constitution of world and subjectivity for the world.*

1) Oriented around **me**, within change. Within the standstill of my kinestheses of walking I have a solid Here, but thereby I do not yet have a determined orientation for this Here. Normal position standing upright, right – left, before – behind, above – below. But I can turn around, return circularly to my recognizable starting position in relation to the recognizable resting things within the perceptual field that present themselves as same, if the same position, and the orientation of its position has returned. Thus, roughly spoken. Already there is need for a description of the surrounding world within the How of its orientation around me, me, having my position in person, which at the same time shall designate for the organism as body being at a point of the room itself. Change of orientation – on the other hand motion of the bodies, motion presenting itself as being oriented.

2) A We, **We** as **ego-mode**. “We” understood as family which has its firm place, with a house, <with> a garden <and> fields around the house for their part. The family can move; change of their location, of their **[152]** place. Oriented world for us, for our family as family, around our respective place – but which has the signification of an “objective” location within the space, within the world.

We, the village, the city. – We in Freiburg. To travel to a town, and being there then, results in an orientation around the town during the stay – results in taking over the orientation which is given to someone living in Freiburg, or rather, [which] he has acquired from childhood <on>. The ego-mode “this village”, “this town”, etc., or <the> mode of the homeland determines modes of the world from there. And differences according to the kind of the I-you-differences, world from a foreign homeland, etc.

Men, living in **home subjectivities**, families in the unity of tribes, tribes living together. But men living in tribes, that is, for whom the tribe is “all-community”, the We, in which all single-egoical and all family life, possibly clan-life is included in a special way, and main-egoically united, do have a **common world in the main orientation of the tribe**. The world is home world for the tribe; and the surrounding tribes have their home world respectively as the [home world] foreign <to him> - each as practical life world in the orientation of the tribe from its home place. But the home place is a place within the “common” world, the **commerce world** for all tribes living together at the same time, that is, again practical surrounding world, higher order. This of course holds true for all modes of the home worldliness.

But now the **orientation according to the cardinal directions** (east, west, south, north) has to be taken into account, and – in connection with the question that needs to be asked in advance -, what subjectively “place” does mean, and <what> corresponds to the directions of orientation from the place, from the place as single person related to his or her standing still, and what corresponds to the “right – left”, “above – below”, “before – behind”, or rather, what corresponds to the place during the change under preservation – in the mode: I am standing still at my place, and in a “normal” posture, but I turn around, and while turning I run through the “spatial directions” as subjectively being organized around me. What is it that makes the synthesis of the current orientations a unity of orientation? This again resulting in a unity of the primordial space within the change of place by way of walking (or being driven by car), and [resulting in] the common space within the intersubjective synthesis of the common space. Then again the question of the universe in the most complete sense.

I am standing on the “ground”, within the room, on the street. Presupposition: a still standing perceptional surrounding world resting in a relatively normal way. Thereby an individual thing can come and go, change itself in this or that way, but amongst identifiable things presenting themselves as same with the same position within the normal constellation, and within the concretely normal uniformity **[153]** together, or on board of a ship on the seemingly resting sea, etc. I identify the same unities of appearance while turning around (visually) (which “afterwards” are accepted as perspectives of the same “things” within the change of position by walking, and constitute themselves <a> unity of appearance of a higher order).

Each of the appearance unities then has its “location” (wherein “later” objective spatial place “presents” itself) with my firm “posture” (and this of course holds already true for complete kinesthetic “rest” as well), and in relation to that the movable, its motion. (But motion “has to constitute itself first of all”). This implies: I can look straight at everything from my position. If I am standing completely still without turning then I have my optical perception field, understood as field of appearance unities that constitute themselves optically by way of other kinestheses, (moving of the eyes, etc.). By bringing into play the kinesthesis of turning, and by ever again making a halt, the change of these perceptional fields, and of their synthesis into a field takes place, a circularly closed [field] from constituted unities of a higher level. Of course I can retrace this into the here used unities of appearance, and perspectives of the same of the lowest level. Now this is a firm connection of positionally organized unities of appearance, each related on its level to my kinesthetic being in a position, while my body constantly appears in quite a special way. The whole description relates to the **external objects**, external unities, and the building of the oriented world presentation, insofar as perception is exclusively in question as external corporeality around my body which is not constituted within this game but has its own constitution. My body – normal position, each organ, like the eye <in> normal position, basic position that makes the straightforward. Oriented field of perception with “right – left”, “above – below”, “before – behind”. Thereby the optical had been preferred while the haptical of course is constantly in question as well.

Within my moving-by-walking ever new fields of perception. Each [is] oriented for itself. But within this change, and [within] the synthesis towards a perceptional surrounding world I still have my room, my being within the closed room of a physical thing, constituted as being within the free open room of the thing. The sky above me, the unitary earth below, the same sky, the same earth. Therefore now something new: the cardinal directions determining sunrise, sunset, cardinal directions. From each home place, or rather from each point on which I am standing – it always remains thus that from there the sun rises in eastern direction, approximately at the same point of my perceptional field, at the horizon, etc.

Constitution of a direction while walking – way towards the east, to go continuously towards the east, or always towards the west, etc. And accordingly the **[154]** moving of things, thereto and from there hither. Then: How does the “east of Freiburg”, etc., constitute itself? All that before the earth is discovered as universal human territory of all territories. Continuously towards the east – and I return from the west. The Englishman can say: “east of, west of us, of England”. But as soon as England has become a world empire, and stretches across the whole globe, such talk makes no more sense.

For the primitive man the surrounding world is oriented as a [surrounding world]intuitionally constituted in itself as intuitional. Of course not the perspectives of a lower level. The synthetic unities of these are only experienced as unities; the perspectives are run through, but [they are] not experienced as being. But the synthesis of the primitive man does not reach further than the most upper unit of the open perceptional field, the horizon of which the perceptional field predelineated [sic] as homogenously continuable. Then there is the question: Which new constitutive motives come into action to proceed to “our” world?

Appendix XI

<Sequence of levels of surroundings or home worlds. Home world and territory>[[3]](#footnote-3)

*<Content:> Surrounding world, home world. The man as the [man] of his surrounding world. Fortune. Myth. Struggle for survival. Self-fashioning. Fortune.*

We have distinguished the different forms that essentially designate the sequence of levels of the surroundings, their types, that lie on the way towards the world of the scientific man. “**Surrounding world**” is the “world”, man consciously immerses himself into, as the one constituted for him as man, the world in which in the widest sense is **his home**, which he creates as his home, or wishes to create, which afterwards has an ever new content, an ever new face for him. The higher levels are founded upon the lower ones, not only genetically, but also statically. The lowest level is the man within his home in the narrowest sense, however primitive or “cultured” it may be. What does “home” designate there? His “house” (it may be a cave, or his tent as a nomad, etc.), his land (his desert, his jungle field), his field, and [his] garden, etc. but also – since home already is a part of the “world” **[155]** – his “relatives”, his family, his tribe. **This home world is a correlate of his own existence**; he is a personal subject for this world, and [he] is subject of his “life” - <one word>, which here does not designate a current life present, but the life in the wide horizon (eventually, at least on a higher level of humanity: his whole life as entirety), **the life that is “granted” to him, or “imposed” on him fatefully**. But correlatively this **entirety** of the life constituted for the man as person has a relatedness in itself to the spatiotemporal entirety of the home world, which is his own, and [which] is correlatively constituted for him.

All persons belonging to my home as relatives have the same home world in a way, only in another “aspect” from them. But not only in different personal orientation like it is shown by the home world having a structure with the help of which the different persons are at the same time “**functionaries**” within: father-function, mother-function, etc. But on the other hand also by this world having for everyone different moods, looking differently according to the temper, having different faces of freedom and unfreedom for everyone, of good and bad luck. In the wider context of men cozily belonging together to other men, each man has an affiliation to his home. We thus have an **articulation** in private homes within a further home: home of the tribe, home village, etc. In addition to that [we have] outsiders – relatives of any home, or of a home organization of a higher level, that with the home unity does not form a unit of a higher home, although it possibly could enter this formation.

Everything we have said of the closest home can be transferred in a wider sense to a respectively enlarged whole of homes. The world reaches beyond any such entirety insofar as it is not only constituted (or has to be constituted) as open-endless world of coziness, or even as a unitary home world, but has the form of a world with homeless areas, no-man’s-land. Any homeland is “**territory**” of a home humanity, the abode. This does not mean settledness in the common sense, since in a wider sense also the nomad is “settled”, because he has his territory in which he wanders, and which he regards as his country, his dominion, [his] ground of sustenance, etc. If a tribe, a people starts looking for a new abode, for a <new> site of his life, it wanders through countries, and possibly through no-man’s-land in which it lives indeed while wandering through it, but not as [living] within its abode, its home. This is thus a **transitional mode**: The people is temporarily “homeless”. And yet it is a people, [it] has its life unity, its surrounding world – in the above mentioned sense [it has] its home world, which though is **[156]** a component within the change of transition, which thus is a mode of spatiotemporal homesteadness.

In this regard we perform general typecasts that are initially determined in an empirical way, and from there we look for eidetic universalities.

But as within the closest home worldly existence we always have apperceptively constituted forms of a higher level for the individuals of the communities which relate to the “meaning” the constituted surrounding world has for these persons or communities.[[4]](#footnote-4)

To the essence of man, of the individual and of the “man on a large scale” the “struggle for survival” does belong, more distinctly said: [it] belongs [to the essence] that the man does not only have merely current endeavors, purposes, needs, and efforts, but <also> that he, immersing into his surrounding world not only can accept it as it is, and cannot merely aim at forming it singly in an appropriate way as if this was possible without much ado. The man has constituted his **life-entirety**, and is as a mature man directed towards forming it in a special way. And correlatively: He aims at forming in a way his home world that has its shape through him at the outset, and to willingly dominate it, so that it satisfies him, so that he can satisfy himself as man, as a practical being through this acting, remodeling, retention, etc. He does not only set single goals, and tries new single goals when he fails. He sets “**goals for life**”, and creates “methods” for the acting existence, based on an overview of the former life in success and failure, over former satisfaction, and dissatisfaction, etc., <based> on self-reflection, critique, universal volitional resolve. Thus he creates a **life-method**, and correlatively a behavior towards the surrounding world striving to give it a more convenient form.

Rivalry of men, of individuals, of home communities, of tribes, peoples, etc. **struggle for survival**. The “wide world”, the inhumane, the unknown substrata, the coincidences, the fortunes, etc, apperceived as obstructing “powers”, or as supportive.[[5]](#footnote-5)

1. 1925. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Beginning of March 1935. Quite cursory notes, but important for the constitution of the real spatiotemporal world, and for the understanding of the primitive „world“. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Possibly 1934. – Editor’s note. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Man as designer of his surrounding world, so that it could satisfy him. Life task, self-fashioning, struggle for survival, fortune, mythologization of the powers of fortune. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. The mythical, the unknown, but apperceived personally as resistance: the “dark fortune”, demons, gods, etc. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)